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Philip Bryden∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 8, 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada released its 
decision in National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal).1 
Justice Wilson’s concurring judgment in the National Corn Growers 
case was among the last of her contributions to the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s jurisprudence prior to her retirement on January 4, 1991. This 
decision was not, perhaps, among the highlights of an extraordinarily 
distinguished judicial career,2 but for a variety of reasons it seems to me 
that the National Corn Growers case is a particularly appropriate focal 
point for consideration of Justice Wilson’s contribution to Canadian 
administrative law jurisprudence. 
During Justice Wilson’s tenure on the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
Court released 80 decisions that held sufficient significance for persons 
interested in Canadian administrative law to be reported in the 
                                                                                                             
∗
 Dean of Law, University of New Brunswick. 
1
 [1990] S.C.J. No. 110, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “National Corn 
Growers”]. 
2
 In his keynote address to the symposium held in Justice Wilson’s honour at Dalhousie 
Law School on October 5, 1991, Chief Justice Brian Dickson paid particular attention to her 
contributions to the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11, as well as criminal law, Aboriginal law and family law. See B. Dickson, “Madame 
Justice Wilson: Trailblazer for Justice” (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 1, at 6. Justice Wilson’s decision in 
National Corn Growers was referenced by Chief Justice Dickson (at 13, note 29) but it occupies a 
minor place in his discussion of her judicial legacy. 
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Administrative Law Reports.3 Justice Wilson wrote reasons for judgment 
in 19 of these cases. Ten of them were constitutional decisions that had 
significant implications for administrative law.4 Five of the cases dealt 
with areas of substantive law that were of importance for particular 
administrative bodies but in which the reasons did not comment 
extensively on the general principles governing judicial review of 
administrative action.5 Only in the four remaining cases did Justice 
Wilson comment at length on the principles governing common law 
judicial review of the decisions of administrative tribunals that are the 
focus of my observations in this article.6 
                                                                                                             
3
 A Westlaw e-Carswell search of Supreme Court of Canada decisions reported in the 
Administrative Law Reports in which Justice Wilson participated in the decision produced 155 hits. 
Since English- and French-language versions of the same case were recorded separately, the 
elimination of duplicate cases produced the result of 80 relevant decisions. 
4
 These cases were: (1) Cuddy Chicks v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1991] S.C.J. 
No. 42, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5 (S.C.C.) (dealing with the availability of remedies for Charter violations 
from administrative tribunals under s. 24 of the Charter and s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982); (2) 
Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [1990] S.C.J. No. 124, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570  
(S.C.C.) (concerning the scope of applicability of the Charter and the availability of remedies from 
labour arbitrators for Charter violations); (3) MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] S.C.J. No. 99, [1989] 2 
S.C.R. 796 (S.C.C.) (dealing with the scope of judicial immunity from public inquiries); a series of 
cases concerning the applicability of s. 11(d) of the Charter in administrative proceedings: ((4) R. v. 
Wigglesworth, [1987] S.C.J. No. 71, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541 (S.C.C.); (5) Burnham v. Metropolitan 
Toronto Police Assn., [1987] S.C.J. No. 70, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 572; (6) Trumbley v. Metropolitan 
Toronto Police Force, [1987] S.C.J. No. 68, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 577 (S.C.C.); and (7) Trimm v. 
Durham Regional Police Force, [1987] S.C.J. No. 72, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 582 (S.C.C.)); (8) Société des 
Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Assn. of Parents for Fairness in Education, Grand Falls 
District 50 Branch, [1986] S.C.J. No. 26, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549 (S.C.C.) (concerning the language 
rights guarantees of s. 19(2) of the Charter); (9) Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. 
No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 (S.C.C.) (concerning the “political questions” doctrine and the extent of 
rights guaranteed under s. 7 of the Charter); and (10) Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.) (dealing with s. 7’s guarantee of 
fair hearing rights for refugee claimants). 
5
 They were: (1) Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1985] S.C.J. No. 75, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 561 (S.C.C.) (concerning the duty of reasonable accommodation under human rights law); 
(2) Kamloops (City) v. Neilsen, [1984] S.C.J. No. 29, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.) (addressing the 
liability of public authorities for negligence); (3) James Richardson & Sons Ltd. v. Minister of 
National Revenue, [1984] S.C.J. No. 28, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 614 (S.C.C.) (dealing with the 
interpretation of investigative powers granted under the Income Tax Act); (4) Hartel Holdings Ltd. 
v. Calgary (City), [1984] S.C.J. No. 17, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 337 (S.C.C.) (concerning the interpretation 
of Alberta land use planning law); and (5) R. v. Eldorado Nuclear Ltd., [1983] S.C.J. No. 87, [1983] 
2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.) (addressing the scope of Crown immunity for Crown corporations being 
prosecuted under the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23). 
6
 In addition to National Corn Growers, supra, note 1 case, these decisions were: (1) W.W. 
Lester (1978) Ltd. v. United Assn. of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting 
Industry, Local 740, [1990] S.C.J. No. 127, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 644 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lester”]; (2) 
Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical and Allied Workers, Local 14, v. Paccar of 
Canada, Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 107, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Paccar”]; and (3) 
Oakwood Development Ltd. v. St. François Xavier (Rural Municipality), [1985] S.C.J. No. 49, 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 164 (S.C.C.). 
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The National Corn Growers decision is the most interesting of these 
four cases in terms of its contribution to Canadian thinking about judicial 
review of administrative decision-making. First of all, it is concerned 
with two central and abiding questions in administrative law, namely, 
the rationales for judicial deference to the substantive decisions of 
administrative tribunals and the methodology courts should employ in 
reviewing those decisions. Second, Justice Wilson’s reasons in this case 
are very satisfying to an administrative law purist since they focus 
almost exclusively on the administrative law dimensions of the case and 
have relatively little to say about the substantive law underlying the 
tribunal’s decision being reviewed. In contrast, in the other significant 
substantive review decisions Justice Wilson wrote during her time on the 
Supreme Court, it is more difficult to tease out how much of her decision 
was driven by her administrative law philosophy and how much by her 
approach to the issues of labour law7 and land use planning law8 that 
were being addressed by the bodies whose decisions were under review. 
Finally, Justice Wilson’s reasons in the National Corn Growers case 
continue to exercise an influence on contemporary Supreme Court of 
Canada jurisprudence on substantive review of the decisions of 
administrative tribunals,9 notwithstanding considerable critical commentary 
on Justice Wilson’s reasoning10 and the twists and turns of that 
jurisprudence itself.11 
It is not my goal in the following article to argue that Justice 
Wilson’s thinking about substantive judicial review as exemplified by 
her reasons in the National Corn Growers case has played a dominant 
role in Canada’s administrative law jurisprudence. Nor is it to attempt to 
                                                                                                             
7
 See Lester and Paccar, id. 
8
 See Oakwood, supra, note 6. 
9
 See, for example, the reasons of Bastarache J. writing for the majority of the Court in 
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 982 (S.C.C.), at paras. 36 and 48 [hereinafter “Pushpanathan”] and Abella J. writing for the 
majority of the Court in Council of Canadians with Disabilities v. VIA Rail Canada Inc., [2007] 
S.C.J. No. 15, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.), at para. 104 [hereinafter “Via Rail”]. 
10
 See, for example, David Mullan, “Of Chaff Midst the Corn: American Farm Bureau 
Federation v. Canada (Canadian Import Tribunal) and Patent Unreasonableness Review” (1991) 45 
Admin. L.R. 264, at 270-71; David Jones & Anne De Villars, Principles of Administrative Law, 2d 
ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Canada Ltd., 1994), at 419-22 and 436-37; David Jones & Anne 
De Villars, Principles of Administrative Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Canada Ltd., 
2004), at 461. 
11
 See, most recently, Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 
190 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunsmuir”] and Assoc. des courtiers et agents immobiliers du Québec v. 
Proprio Direct Inc., [2008] S.C.J. No. 32, 2008 SCC 32 [hereinafter “Proprio Direct”]. 
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spark a revival of Justice Wilson’s thinking about administrative law in 
order to remedy deficiencies in the more recent jurisprudence in the area 
of substantive judicial review. Rather, my observations are designed to 
evaluate Justice Wilson’s reasoning in the National Corn Growers case 
in light of subsequent judicial attempts to develop a more comprehensive 
approach to common law judicial review of substantive administrative 
decision-making in Canada. I conclude that Justice Wilson’s approach to 
judicial review managed to avoid certain pitfalls that were to plague later 
attempts to develop a unified theory of substantive judicial review. 
Nevertheless, in my view her reasons share with more recent 
jurisprudence the weakness that insufficient attention is paid to the 
considerations that justify judicial intervention notwithstanding a more 
general posture of deference to tribunal decision-making. 
I will conduct this analysis in three parts. In the first, I will describe 
the nature of the dispute in the National Corn Growers case and the 
contrasting reasons of Justice Gonthier for the majority and Justice 
Wilson concurring in the result. Second, I will situate Justice Wilson’s 
reasoning in the National Corn Growers case within the framework of 
the evolution of contemporary judicial review doctrine. Finally, I will 
explore some of the key areas of disagreement that have emerged during 
the evolution of substantive judicial review doctrine over the past 20 
years and consider in more detail the relationship between Justice 
Wilson’s insights in National Corn Growers and the resolution of those 
tensions. 
II. THE NATIONAL CORN GROWERS DECISION 
The National Corn Growers case came to the Supreme Court of 
Canada as an appeal from a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal12 
dismissing an application for judicial review under section 28 of the 
Federal Court Act13 of a decision of the Canadian Import Tribunal.14 I 
will set out the decisions at each stage in some detail because the shifting 
nature of the debates that took place as the case wound its way through 
the legal system help to sharpen the focus of the disagreement between 
                                                                                                             
12
 [1988] F.C.J. No. 1154, [1989] 2 F.C. 517 (Fed. C.A.) [hereinafter “National Corn 
Growers (Fed. C.A.)”]. 
13
 R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd Supp.). 
14
 Grain Corn (1987), 14 C.E.R. 1 (Canadian Import Tribunal) [hereinafter “Grain Corn”]. 
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the reasons offered by Wilson and Gonthier JJ. for concluding that the 
courts should not interfere with the Tribunal’s decision. 
The Tribunal had concluded that subsidization of the production of 
corn by the United States was causing a material injury to Canadian corn 
producers within the meaning of section 42 of the Special Import 
Measures Act,15 which rendered American corn vulnerable to the 
imposition of a special import duty. This determination had been the 
subject of controversy even within the Tribunal itself. The majority of 
the panel (President Bertrand and Member Perrigo) concluded that it was 
not necessary to demonstrate that subsidized corn was actually being 
imported into Canada in order to reach a finding that the subsidies were 
causing “material injury” to Canadian producers. It was sufficient if, as 
in this case, the threat of importation of the subsidized product had the 
effect of depressing the prices obtained by Canadian producers of  
the product.16 Member Bissonette, who dissented, took the view that the 
countervail remedy was not available unless it could be demonstrated 
that the harm being suffered was the result of subsidized imports.17 
Member Bissonette conceded that United States subsidies were a 
contributing factor to a depressed world market price for corn,18 but that 
was not a sufficient basis for a finding of material injury to Canadian 
producers within the meaning of SIMA in the absence of evidence that 
subsidized American corn was actually being imported into Canada.  
The Federal Court of Appeal divided along lines similar to the 
Tribunal, though the reasons for its conclusions were slightly different 
than those of the Tribunal. Chief Justice Iacobucci, which whom 
Mahoney J.A. concurred, concluded that the majority of the Tribunal did 
not, in the language of section 28 of the Federal Court Act, “err in law or 
in jurisdiction” in interpreting section 42 of SIMA in a manner that 
                                                                                                             
15
 R.S.C. 1985, c. S-15 [hereinafter “SIMA”]. Section 42 reads, in relevant part:  
 42.(1) The Tribunal, forthwith after receipt by the Secretary pursuant to subsection 
38(2) of a notice of a preliminary determination of dumping or subsidizing in respect of 
goods, shall make inquiry with respect to such of the following matters as is appropriate in 
the circumstances, namely, 
(a) in the case of any goods to which the preliminary determination applies, as to whether 
the dumping or subsidizing of the goods 
(i) has caused, is causing or is likely to cause material injury or has caused or is 
causing retardation, or 
(ii) would have caused material injury or retardation except for the fact that 
provisional duty was imposed in respect of the goods; ... 
16
 See Grain Corn, supra, note 14, at 15 and 21-22. 
17
 Id., at 36-40, 43. 
18
 Id., at 32-36, 42-43. 
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allowed material injury to be demonstrated by the effect of American 
corn subsidies on Canadian corn producers even in the absence of the 
importation of subsidized corn.19 Chief Justice Iacobucci made no 
reference in his reasons to deference to the Tribunal’s interpretation of 
its enabling legislation, and in fact his reasoning for reaching the 
interpretive conclusion he did is quite different than the reasoning of the 
majority of the Tribunal.  
The Tribunal majority took the view that its interpretation of section 
42 of SIMA was consistent with Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)20 whereas Member Bissonnette drew support 
from the GATT Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code for his 
interpretation that section 42 of SIMA only dealt with the effect of 
subsidized imports as distinct from the effect that foreign subsidies have 
on the domestic price of Canadian products in the absence of importation 
of the subsidized product.21 While Iacobucci C.J. accepted the general 
proposition that domestic legislation should be interpreted in a manner 
that is consistent with Canada’s international obligations,22 in his view 
the focus of the interpretive exercise was the wording of the legislation 
implementing an international obligation rather than the treaty itself.23 
Chief Justice Iacobucci’s conclusion on the interpretive issue before him 
is expressed in the following passage: 
In my view section 42 is clear and unambiguous: although other 
sections of the Act refer to the GATT and Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duties Agreement which in turn use the term subsidized imports, 
section 42 refers only to subsidizing of goods or subsidizing and makes 
no reference to subsidized imports as being the cause of material injury 
to producers.24 
It is worth noting that Iacobucci C.J. acknowledged that this 
interpretation might be incompatible with Canada’s fulfilment of its 
international obligations under the GATT, but in his opinion that was a 
matter to be addressed by Parliament rather than by the courts.25 He 
recognized that the Tribunal majority had taken the view that its 
                                                                                                             
19
 National Corn Growers (Fed. C.A.), supra, note 12, at 527, 536-37. 
20
 See Grain Corn, supra, note 14, at 21-22. 
21
 Id., at 37-40. 
22
 See National Corn Growers (Fed. C.A.), supra, note 12, at 528. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id., at 530-31. 
25
 Id., at 532-33. 
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interpretation was consistent with a liberal understanding of the GATT 
but he concluded: “I need not make any comment on whether that 
approach is appropriate or not in matters of this kind because the 
language of section 42 has in my view been otherwise correctly 
interpreted by the Tribunal majority.”26 
Justice MacGuigan dissented. He accepted Mr. Bissonnette’s view 
that if section 42 of SIMA were read in light of the GATT Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties Code, it would be necessary to demonstrate that 
material injury was caused by the presence in Canada of subsidized 
imports rather than by the mere fact of foreign subsidization of a 
product. Indeed, he concluded that “[t]here was no serious dispute in 
argument”27 that this was the case. Justice MacGuigan took a different 
view than Iacobucci C.J. of the jurisprudence concerning the use of 
international treaties as an aid to the interpretation of domestic 
legislation, particularly in situations in which it was evident from both 
external and internal evidence that the legislation was intended to 
implement the international obligation.28 In MacGuigan J.A.’s view, 
SIMA  
is so enmeshed with the Code that it must be taken to be an 
implementation and reflection of it. It must therefore be presumed that 
Parliament intended that SIMA should be interpreted in accordance 
with the Code. Consequently, to the extent that the majority decision of 
[the Tribunal] depended upon an interpretation of SIMA contrary to the 
Code it was vitiated by error of law.29  
In MacGuigan J.A.’s opinion, material injury in the past or present 
as a result of subsidized imports could only be demonstrated if there was 
evidence of an increase in the importation of subsidized goods, which 
was not present in this case.30 Justice MacGuigan recognized that SIMA 
provided for relief not only where material injury had been caused but 
where the foreign action “is likely to cause material injury”.31 In his 
opinion, however, such a determination could only be supported if the 
Tribunal was able to draw an inference from the evidence before it with 
respect to the likelihood of subsidized imports entering into the country 
                                                                                                             
26
 Id., at 533. 
27
 Id., at 545. 
28
 Id., at 552-54. 
29
 Id., at 554. 
30
 Id., at 557. 
31
 Id., at 558, quoting s. 42(1)(a)(i) of SIMA. 
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in future. In MacGuigan J.A.’s view the Tribunal majority’s findings on 
this point were based on mere speculation rather than reasoned 
inferences from the evidence, and he would have returned the matter to 
the Tribunal for reconsideration on whether there was a likelihood of 
future injury that could be causally linked to subsidized imports.32 
Neither Court of Appeal judgment made reference to section 76(1) 
of SIMA, which at the relevant time stated: “Subject to this section and 
paragraph 91(1)(g), every order or finding of the Tribunal is final and 
conclusive.” This section of the Act assumed greater significance in the 
Supreme Court of Canada, since Gonthier J. (with whom La Forest, 
L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ. concurred) treated it as a privative 
clause that prevented judicial interference unless “the tribunal acted 
outside the scope of its mandate by reason of its conclusions being 
patently unreasonable”.33 Justice Wilson (with whom Dickson C.J.C. and 
Lamer J. concurred) also applied the “patently unreasonable” standard of 
review, but it is less obvious from her reasons how significant the 
existence of the privative clause was to her choice of this standard of 
review. On one hand, she does make reference to it in her recitation of 
relevant statutory provisions34 and in her description of Gonthier J.’s 
reasons for applying the “patently unreasonable” standard of review.35 
On the other hand, at several points in her reasons she makes reference 
to judicial deference to tribunals whose decisions are not protected by 
privative clauses36 and the general tenor of her reasons speaks as much to 
judicial deference to the specialized expertise of tribunals in interpreting 
their enabling legislation as to other rationales for a restrictive approach 
to judicial review.37 I will return to the question of the rationales for 
judicial deference to tribunal decision-making later in this article, but for 
now it is sufficient to observe that all members of the Supreme Court of 
Canada were satisfied that a deferential standard of review ought to be 
applied to the Tribunal’s decision. 
                                                                                                             
32
 Id., at 559-61. 
33
 National Corn Growers, [1990] S.C.J. No. 110, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, at 1370 (S.C.C.). 
34
 Id., at 1350-51. 
35
 Id., at 1347. 
36
 Id., at 1340-41, Wilson J. referred to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Volvo 
Canada Ltd. v. U.A.W., Local 720, [1980] S.C.J. No. 104, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 178 (S.C.C.); Douglas 
Aircraft Co. of Canada v. McConnell, [1980] S.C.J. No. 106, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 245 (S.C.C.) and 
Alberta Union of Provincial Employees, Branch 63 v. Olds College, [1982] S.C.J. No. 46, [1982] 1 
S.C.R. 923 (S.C.C.) advocating deference respectively to the decisions of consensual arbitrators, 
statutory arbitrators and labour boards even in the absence of a privative clause. 
37
 See, in particular, National Corn Growers, supra, note 33, at 1335-37, 1343, 1346. 
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Justice Gonthier proceeded to address three issues using the 
“patently unreasonable” standard of review: 
(1) whether it was patently unreasonable for the Tribunal to give 
consideration to the terms of the GATT in interpreting s. 42 of the 
SIMA; 
(2) whether it was patently unreasonable for the Tribunal to conclude 
that, in applying s. 42 to this case, reliance could be placed on 
potential as well as actual imports; and 
(3) whether the Tribunal’s conclusion, on the evidence, that American 
subsidization of imports had caused, was causing and was likely to 
cause material injury to Canadian producers was patently 
unreasonable.38 
With the greatest of respect, the framing of the first issue is 
somewhat surprising. The appellant’s case did not depend on a finding 
that the Tribunal erred in using the GATT to interpret section 42 of 
SIMA; in fact, the appellant’s success depended on the use of the GATT 
to colour the interpretation of statutory language that, in the view of the 
majority of the Court of Appeal, clearly favoured the conclusion reached 
by the majority of the Tribunal. The appellant’s position was that the 
Tribunal majority fundamentally misunderstood the GATT Subsidies 
and Countervailing Duties Code, and therefore erroneously concluded 
that the interpretation they gave to section 42 did not create a conflict 
between that provision and Canada’s international obligations under the 
Code.39 Justice Gonthier noted that no party to the appeal had argued that 
the Tribunal acted unreasonably in referring to the GATT in interpreting 
section 42 of SIMA,40 and it is evident that this part of his reasons was 
directed more toward Iacobucci C.J.’s comments on the use of 
international agreements as an interpretive aid than toward the 
Tribunal’s decision itself. Justice Gonthier rejected Iacobucci C.J.’s 
suggestion that recourse to an international treaty is unavailable as an 
interpretive aid where domestic legislation is unambiguous on its face, 
and indicated that at least where the legislation was designed to 
implement the treaty obligation, the treaty could be used not only to 
                                                                                                             
38
 Id., at 1367-68. 
39
 Justice Gonthier appeared to recognize this in his description of the appellant’s position, 
id., at 1368. 
40
 Id., at 1371. 
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resolve a patent ambiguity but also to determine whether or not a latent 
ambiguity exists.41 
Having concluded that it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal to 
have recourse to the GATT in interpreting section 42 of SIMA, Gonthier 
J. moved on to the centrepiece of his reasons, namely, whether or not the 
Tribunal’s interpretation of section 42 was patently unreasonable. Justice 
Gonthier began this discussion by concentrating on an important passage 
from the Tribunal majority’s judgment in order to undercut the argument 
that the Tribunal majority had misunderstood a key distinction between 
subsidized goods and subsidized imports. In this passage, the Tribunal 
majority appeared to agree with the position taken by the appellants that 
section 42 was designed to address the problems created by subsidized 
imports rather than by subsidization more generally. 
On the other hand, the Tribunal majority took the view that 
“imports” had to include not only goods that were actually imported into 
Canada but “potential or likely imports”.42 In Gonthier J.’s view, the role 
of the Court was to determine whether or not this was an interpretation 
that was open to the Tribunal under SIMA and the GATT, and whether 
the Tribunal had sufficient evidence before it to be able to reasonably 
conclude that the potential import of subsidized corn gave rise to 
material injury in this case.43  
Justice Gonthier concluded that neither SIMA nor the GATT made it 
unreasonable for the Tribunal to have reference to potential imports in 
determining the existence of material injury.44 Justice Gonthier disagreed 
with the view expressed by MacGuigan J.A. in dissent in the Federal 
Court of Appeal that the GATT Code forbade a finding of material 
injury in the absence of an increase in the importation of a subsidized 
product. In Gonthier J.’s view, an increase in subsidized imports was 
only one way in which material injury could be demonstrated.45 He then 
reviewed the evidence before the Tribunal and concluded that it was 
reasonably open to the Tribunal to find in this particular case that 
potential imports of subsidized corn from the United States gave rise to 
material injury to Canadian corn producers, even in the absence of 
evidence of growth in the importation of subsidized corn from the 
                                                                                                             
41
 Id., at 1371-72. 
42
 Id., at 1373, quoting Grain Corn, supra, note 14, at 22. 
43
 Id., at 1374. 
44
 Id., at 1374-78. 
45
 Id., at 1378-79. 
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United States. This was because there was evidence of a considerable 
surplus of United States corn that could easily have been imported had 
Canadian producers failed to reduce their own prices in order to fend off 
competition from imported American corn.46  
As noted above, Wilson J. agreed with Gonthier J.’s disposition of 
the appeal but she disagreed with the reasoning he employed to come to 
this conclusion. Justice Wilson’s own reasons can be broken down into 
two parts. The first was an extended discussion of the general approach 
courts ought to take to judicial review of administrative tribunals, the 
cornerstone of which was her analysis of the implications of the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Canadian Union of Public 
Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.47 The second was 
a much briefer application of these general principles in order to address 
the decision of the Canadian Import Tribunal that was under review. 
Justice Wilson took the position that the C.U.P.E. decision was 
designed to leave behind an approach to judicial review that was 
premised on the assumption that courts played a dominant role in 
ensuring that administrative bodies operated within the strict limits of 
their statutory mandates. It was necessary, in her view, to overcome 
judicial resistance to the proposition that tribunals should not be subject 
to the same review standards as courts. In an important passage, she 
observed that judicial decisions imposing an intrusive standard of 
review: 
. . . reflect a lack of sympathy for the proposition that if administrative 
tribunals are to function effectively and efficiently, then we must 
recognize: (1) that their decisions are crafted by those with specialized 
knowledge of the subject matter before them; and (2) that there is value 
in limiting the extent to which their decisions may be frustrated 
through an expansive judicial review.48 
Having identified the type of approach to judicial review that in her 
view C.U.P.E. was designed to avoid, Wilson J. then sought to put 
forward a positive vision of what the C.U.P.E. approach to judicial 
review was designed to achieve. Justice Wilson initially sought to 
enumerate the reasons for judicial deference to the interpretations 
administrative tribunals gave to their enabling legislation. She identified, 
in greater or lesser detail, four different rationales for judicial deference 
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to the decisions of tribunals, all of which were relevant to this particular 
case. It is less clear whether or not Wilson J. recognized that these 
rationales do not always reinforce each other, and that in some instances 
they lead to quite different conclusions about when deference is and is 
not appropriate, or when judicial interference is warranted notwith-
standing a general posture of deference. 
The first rationale for deference that Wilson J. identified is what 
might be described as the “statutory indeterminacy” rationale. This 
rationale draws on the observation of Dickson J. (as he then was) in 
C.U.P.E. that statutes rarely have a uniquely “correct” meaning that 
judges are specially qualified to ascertain.49 This rationale is not so much 
a justification for judicial deference as a rebuttal of the traditional claim 
that the role of judicial review is to ensure that administrative bodies 
confine themselves to the mandate conferred on them by the legislature. 
At a minimum the indeterminacy rationale suggests that judges should 
not use the cloak of statutory interpretation to substitute their policy 
preferences for those of the tribunal that is interpreting its mandate, but it 
is less obvious what guidance it offers about the circumstances in which 
judicial intervention is warranted. 
The second rationale for deference pointed out by Wilson J. could be 
described as the “presumed expertise” rationale. This rationale, which is 
also present in the C.U.P.E. decision, rests on the suggestion that 
specialized tribunals may actually be better placed than courts to make 
assessments of the interpretation of the tribunal’s mandate that best 
serves the statutory purposes for which the tribunal was established.50 I 
call it the “presumed expertise” rationale because Wilson J. did not spell 
out how one is to decide whether or not the presumption that a tribunal is 
better placed than a court to make these types of assessments is justified. 
It is worth noting that this rationale carries with it, at least obliquely, the 
seeds for greater judicial intervention than the “statutory indeterminacy” 
rationale. This is because the presumed expertise rationale suggests that 
the object of the interpretive exercise is not merely to ensure that 
decisions fall within a range of justifiable choices, but to select the 
choice that best serves the tribunal’s statutory goals. In many instances 
the tribunal is likely to make that choice more effectively than a 
reviewing court, but it is not obvious that it will always do so. 
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Justice Wilson’s third rationale for deference overlaps with but is 
slightly different than the second, and it can be described as the 
“economic management” rationale. The idea here is that some agencies 
are established in order to carry out economic regulatory or management 
functions with which courts are particularly ill-equipped to interfere. 
Even though these agencies often have to interpret their enabling 
legislation in order to carry out their regulatory or managerial functions, 
there may not be a sharp demarcation between statutory interpretation 
and policy-making. Moreover, interpreting legislation in a manner that 
reflects sound policy choices is likely to call upon technical skills or 
specialized knowledge of an industry that are quite different than the 
skills of textual analysis that judges typically rely upon in interpreting 
legislation.51 Although Wilson J. does not spell this out, the implication 
is that some types of tribunal activity are more appropriate for judicial 
intervention than others, and this idea emerges explicitly in subsequent 
jurisprudence.52 The distinction between the “presumed expertise” 
rationale and the “economic management” rationale is that the subject 
matter of the tribunal’s expertise makes a difference, with the decisions 
of some expert tribunals (for instance, human rights tribunals) being 
more vulnerable to judicial intervention than the decisions of other 
tribunals (for example, securities commissions). 
The fourth rationale for judicial deference Wilson J. identified can 
be called the “legislative choice” rationale. This rationale rests on the 
right of the legislature, within constitutional limits,53 to curtail statutorily 
the scope of judicial review of administrative decision-making. The 
strong form of such limitations consists of the privative clause, and 
Wilson J. did discuss the significance of privative clauses as a rationale 
for limiting the intensity of judicial review, as did Dickson J. (as he then 
was) in the C.U.P.E. case.54 Justice Wilson did not confine this rationale 
to situations in which the legislature had expressly chosen to restrict the 
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scope of judicial review, however, and embraced the broader argument 
that the legislative choice to confer adjudicative authority on a 
specialized tribunal was itself a reason for presuming that the legislature 
intended courts to play a limited role in supervising the tribunal’s 
exercise of its statutory mandate.55 A variation on the “legislative 
choice” rationale for deference, to which Wilson J. did not give as much 
attention as she might have, is a legislative preference for decision-
making arrangements that sacrifice some level of quality control in order 
to promote goals such as speed, accessibility or affordability. This line of 
argument appears most often in procedural review cases as a justification 
for significant departures from procedures modelled on those used by 
courts, but it is not entirely irrelevant as a justification for limits on 
judicial review, since any gains in quality of outcomes that may be 
produced by more expansive judicial review are inevitably purchased at 
a cost in terms of lack of finality, delay and financial expense, both to 
parties and to the justice system. 
Justice Wilson did not go so far as to adopt Professor Brian 
Langille’s thesis that the Supreme Court of Canada had deliberately 
adopted through a series of decisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s a 
“restrictive and unified” theory of judicial review.56 Nevertheless, the 
overall tone of her remarks suggests considerable sympathy with this 
approach. Moreover, she did explicitly take aim at the possibility that in 
its more recent decisions the Court had “shown signs of hesitation about 
its commitment to the position set out in C.U.P.E.”.57 In particular, she 
emphasized that courts should be careful not to be excessively eager to 
classify a statutory provision being interpreted by a tribunal as one that 
conferred jurisdiction on the tribunal. According to the jurisprudence at 
the time, tribunal interpretations of these types of statutory provisions 
were to be reviewed by courts using the “correctness” standard, and 
Wilson J. saw the possible expansion of this category of provisions as 
having the potential to undermine the progress Canadian courts had 
made toward adopting a deferential approach to tribunal decision-
making.58 Having made that observation, Wilson J. refrained from a 
more detailed discussion of the proper approach to identifying 
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jurisdiction-limiting statutory provisions since there was no dispute in 
the present appeal that the interpretation of section 42 of SIMA fell 
squarely within the Canadian Import Tribunal’s jurisdiction.59 
Justice Wilson’s observations on the rationales for judicial deference 
to the interpretations specialized tribunals give to their enabling 
legislation formed the backdrop to her analysis of the National Corn 
Growers case itself. This analysis was centrally concerned with the 
methodology the Court should adopt in reviewing the Tribunal’s 
decision. Her criticism of Gonthier J.’s reasons was that he did not 
concern himself exclusively with the question of whether the Tribunal’s 
interpretation of section 42 of SIMA was patently unreasonable, but also 
addressed a variety of other questions, such as whether or not it was 
appropriate for the Tribunal to refer to the GATT in interpreting section 
42 of SIMA, whether the Tribunal’s interpretation of section 42 
conflicted with Canada’s international obligations under the GATT, and 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support the Tribunal’s findings 
of material injury.60 In the context of this case, Wilson J. concluded that: 
. . . [T]he only issue which this Court may consider, once it accepts 
that the interpretation of a given provision is a matter that falls within a 
tribunal’s jurisdiction, is whether the Tribunal’s interpretation of the 
provision is “so patently unreasonable that its construction cannot be 
rationally supported by the relevant legislation”. Thus, if one 
determines that the Canadian Import Tribunal’s interpretation of s. 42 
of the Act is not “so patently unreasonable that its construction cannot 
be rationally supported by the relevant legislation”, then the inquiry 
must come to an end.61 
In light of the foregoing discussion it is hardly surprising that 
Wilson J. concluded that the Tribunal’s interpretation of section 42 of 
SIMA was not patently unreasonable. Section 42 may not have been a 
provision that “bristles with ambiguities” in Dickson J.’s famous 
phrase,62 but it is evident that a number of Canada’s finest judicial minds 
experienced difficulty in agreeing on whether it was directed at 
subsidized foreign products that had a material impact on Canadian 
producers of those products (Iacobucci C.J.), subsidized imports that 
actually made their way into the Canadian marketplace and therefore had 
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an impact or potential impact on Canadian producers (MacGuigan J.A.) 
or subsidized foreign products that were potentially imported into 
Canada and therefore had a material impact on Canadian producers 
(Gonthier J.). This interpretive disagreement extended not only to 
section 42 of SIMA but to the GATT Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duties Code itself, so even if one accepted the argument that the 
Tribunal ought to interpret SIMA in a manner consistent with the Code, 
this did not represent a significant advance in addressing the question of 
how the Tribunal ought to have interpreted section 42. Under the 
circumstances, all four of the rationales for judicial deference identified 
by Wilson J. militated in favour of judicial acceptance of the Tribunal 
majority’s conclusion on the proper interpretation of the statute. 
Nevertheless, it is worth examining how Wilson J. expressed her 
conclusion that the Tribunal’s decision should stand. She wrote: 
… [W]hile the Tribunal’s interpretation of s. 42 might well be 
unsatisfactory to those concerned to secure a more liberal international 
trade policy, in my view it can hardly be described as an interpretation 
that is “so patently unreasonable that its construction cannot be 
rationally supported by the relevant legislation”. The terms “subsidy” 
and “subsidized goods” are defined in very broad terms indeed and the 
definition of “material injury” certainly cannot be said to preclude the 
“broader” interpretation of s. 42(1) that the Tribunal favoured. If the 
Tribunal’s interpretation is one that the legislature concludes is not in 
Canada’s interests or is not consistent with Canada’s international 
obligations, then it is for the legislature to amend the Act to provide 
narrower definitions of the terms used in the relevant provision.63  
The focus of this passage seems to be on Parliament’s choice of the 
Tribunal as opposed to the courts as the body to provide authoritative 
meaning to SIMA rather than on the likelihood that the Tribunal was 
better equipped than the courts to provide the interpretation most 
consistent with the effective administration of the statute. To this extent, 
the “legislative choice” rationale for deference seems to be the most 
significant influence on Wilson J.’s own conclusion, notwithstanding the 
emphasis she gives to the “presumed expertise” and “economic 
management” rationales earlier in her reasons. 
This does not resolve the methodological disagreement between 
Wilson J. and Gonthier J., however, and it is useful at this stage to make 
three additional observations about this disagreement before considering 
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Wilson J.’s reasoning in a larger context. The first is that despite their 
methodological disagreement, both Wilson J. and Gonthier J. used the 
words “patently unreasonable” and “unreasonable” interchangeably.64 
This level of agreement in the earlier case law is particularly significant 
in light of the jurisprudential odyssey beginning with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, 
Competition Act) v. Southam Inc.65 and ending with the Court’s recent 
decision in Dunsmuir,66 in which Canadian judges struggled valiantly to 
find a workable distinction between two different “reasonableness” 
standards of review (“reasonableness simpliciter” and “patent unreason-
ableness”) before finally abandoning the effort. 
The second point is that it is not entirely clear whether Wilson J.’s 
comments on the limited role of courts on judicial review represented a 
general statement about the limits of judicial review or a specific 
statement about the limits of judicial review in the context of the 
National Corn Growers case itself. Certainly the first sentence of Wilson 
J.’s conclusion on the limited scope of judicial review quoted above67 is 
expressed in categorical terms. A number of commentators have 
understood her observations in this way and have criticized them, in my 
respectful view correctly, as representing too limited a conception of the 
role of judicial review.68 A more charitable reading of Wilson J.’s 
comments, focusing on the second sentence in the passage quoted above, 
might be that she believed that the appellant’s arguments in this 
particular case all hinged on the willingness of the Court to intervene to 
modify the Tribunal’s understanding of the mandate it was given under 
section 42 of SIMA, and once the Court concluded that it would not do 
so, its role was at an end. Even if one accepts this reading of Wilson J.’s 
comments, it seems to me that there is some merit in Gonthier J.’s 
response that it is important for a reviewing court to take the Tribunal’s 
own reasoning process seriously in order to determine whether the 
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interpretation the Tribunal gave to its enabling legislation was a 
reasonable one.69 
The final observation I would make about the methodological debate 
between Wilson J. and Gonthier J. in the National Corn Growers case is 
that it is important to bear in mind that all of their jurisprudential 
references and their discussion about the role of judicial review are 
concentrated on a particular segment of the administrative law world, 
namely, the specialized adjudicative or regulatory tribunal. As Canadian 
courts have pursued the more ambitious goal of developing “an 
overarching or unifying theory for review of the substantive decisions of 
all statutory or prerogative decision makers”,70 it should hardly be 
surprising that we see coming into play a broader range of considerations 
along with a more sophisticated understanding of the full array of 
institutional arrangements available. This observation is not meant to 
belittle the contribution the debate between Wilson J. and Gonthier J. has 
made to our collective understanding of the approach judges ought to 
take on judicial review applications, but it is helpful to remind ourselves 
that this debate took place within a frame of reference that was 
somewhat more limited than the one that has come to be employed over 
the past decade.  
III. THE EVOLUTION OF CANADIAN SUBSTANTIVE 
REVIEW JURISPRUDENCE 
It is useful to divide the recent development of Canadian jurisprudence 
governing the substantive judicial review of administrative decision-
making into three phases or stages. The first stage is marked by the 
attempt to establish a general framework for deciding when courts 
should show deference to the decisions of administrative tribunals. In 
terms of the Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, it can be said to 
begin with the Court’s 1978 decision in C.U.P.E.71 and culminate in the 
Pushpanathan72 decision in 1998. The second phase is characterized by 
the elaboration of the Pushpanathan decision and its expansion into a 
                                                                                                             
69
 National Corn Growers, [1990] S.C.J. No. 110, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, at 1383 (S.C.C.). 
70
 Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] S.C.J. No. 18, 
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 226 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dr. Q”], at para. 25 (per McLachlin C.J.C.), quoting 
David Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 108. 
71
 Supra, note 47. 
72
 Supra, note 52. 
(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LEGACY 243 
“unifying theory” as described in Dr. Q73 in 2003. While this phase is 
identified with the expansion of the Pushpanathan decision into new 
corners of administrative decision-making, it is also characterized by 
expressions of dissatisfaction with elements of the Pushpanathan 
framework. We are currently in the third stage, which is marked by an 
attempt to simplify and scale back elements of the framework. This 
represents an attempt to reconcile those whose criticisms had been 
largely rejected during the second, expansionist phase to a modified 
version of the dominant jurisprudence. The boundary between the 
second and third phase is not as sharp as the one between the first and 
the second, and it could be argued that it only began in earnest with the 
Court’s attempt to recast standard of review jurisprudence in Dunsmuir74 
in 2008. On the other hand, one can see signs of this phase emerging as 
early as the Court’s decision in Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan,75 
released the same day as Dr. Q. 
It would be a gross over-simplification to suggest that the 
jurisprudence developed in a seamless fashion during each of the stages 
described above. The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions on 
substantive judicial review were far from unanimous during any of the 
phases I have just identified, and a different chronology could be 
constructed by concentrating on areas of disagreement rather than by 
putting the focus on areas where a consensus seems to emerge over 
time.76 Nevertheless, it seems to me that with the benefit of hindsight it is 
possible to discern a pattern of development within which Wilson J.’s 
reasons in the National Corn Growers case can be usefully located. 
Chronologically, the National Corn Growers case belongs in the 
middle of the first phase, during which the Supreme Court of Canada 
made deference to tribunal decision-making an express part of the 
jurisprudence governing substantive review but grappled to find a 
framework for determining when deference would be available and 
when it would not. In the Supreme Court jurisprudence between 
C.U.P.E. and National Corn Growers, much attention was focused on 
drawing a distinction between cases where tribunals were interpreting 
statutory provisions that conferred jurisdiction on them or expressed the 
limits of their jurisdiction, in which case the tribunal’s interpretation was 
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not entitled to deference, and the interpretation of provisions falling 
within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, which were entitled to deference, at 
least if the tribunal’s decision was protected by a privative clause.77 On 
the face of it, because this issue did not arise in the National Corn 
Growers case itself, Wilson J. had little to say about how the distinction 
should be drawn other than to suggest that it should not be drawn in a 
manner that undermined the Court’s general posture of deference to the 
decisions of specialized tribunals.78 As the case law evolved over the 
course of the 1990s, however, this line of authority became subsumed in 
a more general discussion of the circumstances in which deference was 
or was not warranted, and Wilson J.’s general observations on the 
rationales for deference are relevant to this discussion. 
Three themes emerged during the course of this debate. The first was 
that deference to tribunal decision-making was not confined to tribunals 
whose decisions were protected by privative clauses. This development 
had already occurred prior to the National Corn Growers decision, as 
Wilson J. pointed out in her reasons, but it was to accelerate as the 1990s 
wore on.79 The second theme was the emergence of a very restrictive 
definition of when a tribunal’s interpretation of its enabling legislation 
could be deemed “patently unreasonable”.80 This development was 
somewhat at odds with the willingness of the Supreme Court of Canada 
majority in the Lester case,81 and Wilson J. herself in a dissenting 
judgment in Paccar,82 to invalidate tribunal decisions using the “patently 
unreasonable” standard of review. This tension was to intensify in the 
expansionist phase that followed the Court’s decision in Pushpanathan83 
and was one of the factors that contributed to the retrenchment we are 
seeing in the current stage of jurisprudential development. The third 
theme, which was influenced by the first and second, was the 
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development of a spectrum of standards of review to fill in the 
conceptual territory where some deference was warranted but where the 
Supreme Court was uncomfortable confining courts to an extremely 
limited review role using the restrictive version of the “patently 
unreasonable” standard. The view at the time, expressed most clearly by 
Iacobucci J.,84 was that the logic of a sophisticated and comprehensive 
system of judicial review required at least one intermediate review 
standard to occupy the ground between correctness review and review 
employing a very deferential “patently unreasonable” standard. 
Although Bastarache J.’s decision in Pushpanathan has become the 
foundation for the subsequent development of standard of review 
jurisprudence, the structure of Bastarache J.’s reasons suggests that he 
saw the exercise as a consolidation of the previous jurisprudence rather 
than a fresh start in the Court’s thinking about standards of review. 
Perhaps for that reason, the decision tends to blend different strands of 
jurisprudence together as factors in a four-part test for determining the 
appropriate standard of review. These factors are: (1) the presence or 
absence of a privative clause or right of appeal;85 (2) the relative 
expertise of the court and the tribunal with respect to the issue in 
dispute;86 (3) the purpose of the statutory scheme, and in particular the 
statutory provisions that are in dispute;87 and (4) the nature of the 
problem, and in particular whether it involved mainly legal or factual 
questions.88 By analyzing these factors in respect of each issue in 
dispute, a reviewing court was to identify the appropriate standard of 
review for each issue along a spectrum of standards ranging from 
correctness to the “patently unreasonable” standard of review.89 
The first three of these factors are linked respectively to the 
“legislative choice”, “presumed expertise” and “economic management” 
rationales for judicial deference to tribunal decision-making identified 
by Wilson J. in the National Corn Growers90 case. Justice Wilson herself 
did not create these rationales, but she did express them in a particularly 
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clear fashion and Bastarache J. acknowledged his intellectual debt to her 
reasons in National Corn Growers in two passages in his reasons in 
Pushpanathan. He referred generally to National Corn Growers to 
illustrate the proposition that courts may defer to expert tribunals even 
with respect to matters of statutory interpretation91 and specifically to 
Wilson J.’s reasons in support of the view that judicial deference was 
particularly appropriate in reviewing decisions of agencies engaged in 
economic management.92 
To the extent that Wilson J.’s reasons in National Corn Growers were 
designed to promote a general posture of judicial deference to tribunal 
decision-making, however, her views did not carry the day. To some 
extent this development was inevitable as the Supreme Court of Canada 
moved from thinking about the proper approach to the review of decisions 
made by specialized tribunals, whose members could be considered to be 
subject matter experts and whose decisions were often protected by 
privative clauses, to review of the full range of administrative action that 
extended to decisions of mass justice bureaucracies, elected local 
government officials and beyond. On the other hand, the multi-factor 
analysis developed in Pushpanathan was sufficiently malleable that the 
courts were able to grant and withhold deference on a much more 
selective basis than one would expect if Wilson J.’s reasoning in the 
National Corn Growers case were being applied. 
Two illustrations are sufficient for present purposes. The first is the 
Pushpanathan case itself. It had significant parallels to National Corn 
Growers since the Court was reviewing a decision of a specialized 
federal tribunal charged with interpreting a statute that was designed to 
implement an international obligation, in this case the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.93 It would not be difficult 
to imagine a court drawing an analogy with National Corn Growers and 
concluding that the Immigration and Refugee Board’s interpretation of 
its enabling legislation ought to be entitled to judicial deference. 
Notwithstanding these similarities, however, the Supreme Court of 
Canada was unanimous in concluding that the “correctness” standard of 
review should be applied.94  
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Justice Bastarache’s elaborate reasons for choosing the correctness 
standard certainly offered plausible grounds for distinguishing the 
decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board in Pushpanathan from 
those of the Canadian Import Tribunal in National Corn Growers. The 
decisions of the Board were not protected by a privative clause,95 and 
arguably the scheme of limiting access to judicial review to situations in 
which a “serious question of general importance”96 was certified by the 
Federal Court Trial Division (as it then was) signalled a legislative 
intention to have the courts review decisions that were so certified using 
the correctness standard.97 Likewise, the Convention Refugee Determin-
ation Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board was determining 
legal rights and obligations rather than engaging in the type of 
polycentric interest balancing characteristic of a regulatory agency 
carrying out economic management functions.98 
Nevertheless, the Pushpanathan decision also sowed the seeds of 
greater intervention in the work of economic regulatory bodies through 
the approach the Court took to the definition of a tribunal’s specialized 
expertise. Justice Bastarache concluded that the Board did not have 
greater expertise than the courts in interpreting its enabling legislation 
because its work involved “general questions of law” and its enabling 
legislation did not require all members to have specialized legal 
expertise.99 Justice Wilson in National Corn Growers presumed that the 
Canadian Import Tribunal had expertise because of the specialized 
character of its adjudicative role, but after Pushpanathan, courts would 
be able to define the relative expertise of courts and tribunals by 
concentrating on the precise nature of the issue in dispute and by close 
scrutiny of the structure of the administrative body whose decisions were 
under review.100 
The second illustration can be found in a Supreme Court of Canada 
decision from the second phase of development of the standard of review 
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framework: Barrie Public Utilities v. Canadian Cable Television Assn.101 
In that case, the Supreme Court majority held that the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission did not have 
specialized expertise relative to the courts in interpreting a provision of 
its enabling legislation governing access to the supporting structures of 
transmission lines since this was not considered to be a question of a 
technical nature. Justice Bastarache disagreed. He adopted Wilson J.’s 
view that an expert tribunal is normally entitled to deference in its 
interpretation of its enabling legislation because the tribunal is typically 
in a better position than the Court to understand both the policy context 
and the policy implications of different interpretive choices.102 In 
contrast, by segmenting the tribunal’s expertise into technical matters 
that were entitled to deference and matters of general statutory 
interpretation that were not, the majority effectively undermined the 
tribunal’s ability to authoritatively interpret its mandate in the manner 
that was most consistent with the interplay between statutory language 
and public policy goals, and asserted the primacy of the textual approach 
to interpretation typically favoured by judges. 
As the Barrie Public Utilities case demonstrates, the Pushpanathan 
decision provided Canadian courts with a framework for addressing 
questions of when they should defer to the decisions of administrative 
bodies rather than a set of bright line tests for answering those questions. 
The Supreme Court of Canada obviously thought that answers would 
become clear as courts at all levels of the justice system gained 
experience in using the framework. The Court quickly embraced the 
framework, and expanded its use from the review of the decisions of 
administrative tribunals to the review of discretionary decisions by 
public officials103 and then to the substantive review of the exercise of 
delegated legislative authority and other policy decisions by local 
government.104 By 2001, Canada’s leading academic commentator on 
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administrative law, Professor David Mullan, was describing the 
Pushpanathan framework as “an overarching or unifying theory for 
review of the substantive decisions of all manner of statutory and 
prerogative decision-makers”,105 a description that was explicitly adopted 
in 2003 by McLachlin C.J.C. writing for a unanimous Supreme Court of 
Canada in the Dr. Q case.106 
While disagreements about the application of the framework in 
particular cases were to be expected,107 there were also disquieting signs 
of dissatisfaction with the framework itself even during the expansionist 
phase of its development. At the Supreme Court of Canada, these 
expressions of dissatisfaction were put forward most forcefully by LeBel 
J. in a series of dissenting and minority judgments beginning with the 
Chamberlain case in 2002. The concern he expressed in Chamberlain 
was that it was inappropriate to use a framework designed with reference 
to administrative tribunals in order to assess the proper standard of 
review of decisions of local government bodies. In his view, the attempt 
to do so was likely to distort rather than clarify judicial thinking about 
how to approach the relationship between the courts and these 
organizations.108 In Toronto (City) v. Canadian Union of Public 
Employees, Local 79,109 and Voice Construction Ltd. v. Construction and 
General Workers’ Union, Local 92,110 however, LeBel J. raised more 
fundamental questions about the way the Pushpanathan framework was 
being used by the courts. First, he asked whether the four-factor analysis 
was not overly complicated in at least some cases, with the result that the 
courts risked going through a formulaic exercise to reach a result that 
could have been obtained much more simply.111 Second, and more 
fundamentally, he raised serious questions about how the “patently 
unreasonable” standard of review had been defined and applied in recent 
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Supreme Court of Canada decisions112 and about the utility of the 
conceptual distinctions the Court had attempted to draw between review 
using the “patent unreasonableness” and “reasonableness simpliciter” 
standards.113 
The Supreme Court of Canada did not concede that major surgery on 
the Pushpanathan framework was needed until it released its decision in 
Dunsmuir114 in 2008, but there were earlier signs that the Court was 
sensitive to the argument that the framework was excessively complicated. 
Even the Ryan decision,115 released at the peak of the Court’s commitment 
to the Pushpanathan framework in 2003, represents a concession to the 
demand for simplicity since it signals a shift from the idea that a variety of 
standards of review existed on a continuum to a commitment to use only 
three standards of review: correctness, reasonableness simpliciter and 
patent unreasonableness. Justice Iacobucci, who wrote the reasons for a 
unanimous Court, acknowledged that greater refinement in the standard of 
review framework is not always productive. He observed:  
At this point, the multiplication of standards past the three already 
identified would force reviewing courts and the parties that appear 
before them into complex and technical debates at the outset. I am not 
convinced that the increase in complexity generated by adding a fourth 
standard would lead to greater precision in achieving the objectives of 
judicial review of administrative action.116  
Other gestures in the direction of simplification were soon to follow. 
In United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary 
(City),117 decided in 2004, the Court decided that where the question at 
issue was whether or not a municipal by-law was ultra vires, the 
Pushpanathan analysis was unnecessary because correctness would 
always be the appropriate standard of review. And in her reasons for the 
majority in VIA Rail, decided in 2007, Justice Abella signalled that the 
Court was open to collapsing the distinction between the two 
“reasonableness” standards of review.118  
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If the Supreme Court of Canada’s retreat from elements of its 
previous standard of review jurisprudence in Dunsmuir cannot be said to 
come as a complete surprise, the reasons of Bastarache and LeBel JJ. for 
the majority in Dunsmuir nevertheless represent a significant concession 
to those who had expressed concerns about the complexity of the 
Pushpanathan framework for judicial review. In particular, the explicit 
abandonment of the third standard of review,119 an idea that had been 
part of the Court’s jurisprudence since 1997120 and had been expressly 
endorsed by a unanimous Court in Ryan121 as recently as 2004, suggests 
that those who believe that the standard of review jurisprudence had 
become unnecessarily complex have won the upper hand. Moreover, the 
minority judgment of Deschamps J. in Dunsmuir (concurred in by 
Charron and Rothstein JJ.) and her dissenting judgment in Proprio 
Direct122 (concurred in by Rothstein J.) indicate that at least some 
members of the Court are interested in further shrinking the range of 
circumstances in which courts defer to the decisions of tribunals.  
Despite these concessions, however, the majority reasons in 
Dunsmuir represent a retreat from the most elaborate expression of the 
Pushpanathan framework rather than a wholesale abandonment of 
judicial deference to tribunal decision-making. In particular, the 
discussion Bastarache and LeBel JJ. offered on the selection of the ap-
propriate standard of review was designed to simplify the use of the 
Pushpanathan framework without fundamentally compromising the frame-
work’s basic features. While Bastarache and LeBel JJ. identified a 
number of situations in which courts would be able to select the 
appropriate standard of review without going through a full standard of 
review analysis using the Pushpanathan framework,123 the factors that 
make up the framework remain intact and continue to be applicable 
where it is not possible for a court to reach a definitive conclusion using 
a simplified analysis.124 
Justice Wilson’s reasons in National Corn Growers125 are not referred 
to in Dunsmuir, and the use of three distinct standards of review was 
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developed after she left the Court, so it is difficult to predict how she would 
have viewed the Court’s abandonment of the third standard of review in 
Dunsmuir. On the whole, however, I do not believe this development 
would have troubled her. As her dissenting judgment in the Paccar case 
reveals, she did not believe that a general posture of deference to tribunal 
decision-making prevented courts from intervening where a tribunal made 
an interpretive or policy choice that was not consistent with or supportable 
by the tribunal’s enabling legislation.126 In the same case, she indicated that 
she did not favour an approach to judicial review using the “patently 
unreasonable” standard that would “define patent unreasonableness in 
terms of rational indefensibility”,127 arguing that the substitution of one 
phrase for another was not helpful and that a “rational indefensibility” test 
might be viewed as even more restrictive of judicial intervention than the 
“patently unreasonable” standard. As I noted earlier, in National Corn 
Growers both Wilson J. and Gonthier J. used the terms “patently 
unreasonable” and “unreasonable” interchangeably, and I do not believe 
that she would have found it offensive for the courts to use a unified 
“reasonableness” standard to express their deference to tribunal decision-
making. 
What is less clear is how she would have viewed the approach to 
reasonableness review endorsed by Bastarache and LeBel JJ. in Dunsmuir. 
Their thoughts on this subject are worth quoting at some length: 
 The move towards a single reasonableness standard does not pave 
the way for a more intrusive review by courts and does not represent a 
return to pre-Southam formalism. In this respect, the concept of 
deference, so central to judicial review in administrative law, has 
perhaps been insufficiently explored in the case law. What does 
deference mean in this context? Deference is both an attitude of the 
court and a requirement of the law of judicial review. It does not mean 
that courts are subservient to the determinations of decision makers, or 
that courts must show blind reverence to their interpretations, or that 
they may be content to pay lip service to the concept of reasonableness 
review while in fact imposing their own view. Rather, deference 
imports respect for the decision-making process of adjudicative bodies 
with regard to both the facts and the law. The notion of deference “is 
rooted in part in a respect for governmental decisions to create 
administrative bodies with delegated powers” [Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554, at p. 596, per L’Heureux-
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Dubé J., dissenting]. We agree with David Dyzenhaus where he states 
that the concept of “deference as respect” requires of the courts “not 
submission but a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which 
could be offered in support of a decision”: “The Politics of Deference: 
Judicial Review and Democracy”, in M. Taggart, ed., The Province of 
Administrative Law (1997), 279, at p. 286 (quoted with approval in 
Baker, at para. 65, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.; Ryan, at para. 49). 
 Deference in the context of the reasonableness standard therefore 
implies that courts will give due consideration to the determinations of 
decision makers. As Mullan explains, a policy of deference 
“recognizes the reality that, in many instances, those working day to 
day in the implementation of frequently complex administrative 
schemes have or will develop a considerable degree of expertise or 
field sensitivity to the imperatives and nuances of the legislative 
regime”: D.J. Mullan, “Establishing the Standard of Review: The 
Struggle for Complexity?” (2004), 17 C.J.A.L.P. 59, at p. 93. In short, 
deference requires respect for the legislative choices to leave some 
matters in the hands of administrative decision makers, for the 
processes and determinations that draw on particular expertise and 
experiences, and for the different roles of the courts and administrative 
bodies within the Canadian constitutional system.128 
Insofar as Bastarache and LeBel JJ. were endorsing the “legislative 
choice” rationale for deference in this passage, their reasons are 
consistent with Wilson J.’s general observations in the National Corn 
Growers case and the primacy her conclusions appear to accord to that 
rationale. It is less obvious how this rationale is to be reconciled with the 
notion of deference as respect. It has never seemed to me that 
disagreement with another decision-maker’s conclusions automatically 
implies lack of respect. A reviewing court (or, for that matter, an 
academic commentator) can sometimes fail to give serious consideration 
to the reasoning that influenced a decision-maker to select a particular 
course of action, and that failure can be said to indicate a lack of respect. 
But serious consideration is not the same thing as agreement, and it is 
not clear to me why deference as respect should require a reviewing 
court to prefer a tribunal’s interpretation of its enabling legislation to the 
interpretation that seems more persuasive to a court where the issue is 
one on which reasonable people could disagree, which will often be the 
case. At a minimum, it seems to me that the idea of deference as respect 
implies an approach to judicial review that is more consistent with 
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Gonthier J.’s detailed analysis of the reasons offered by various 
decision-makers in the National Corn Growers case than Wilson J.’s 
approach, and that it is likely to lead to greater judicial intervention in 
tribunal decision-making than if her preferred methodology were 
adopted. 
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JUSTICE WILSON’S REASONING FOR 
CONTEMPORARY STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS 
Having situated Wilson J.’s reasoning in National Corn Growers129 
within the framework of the development of contemporary standard of 
review analysis, what conclusions can we draw about the significance of 
her reasons for that jurisprudence? I have already touched on a number 
of the areas of disagreement that have featured prominently in the 
jurisprudence since the National Corn Growers decision was rendered, 
but it may be convenient to enumerate them for purposes of this 
discussion. The first is the scope of judicial review, and more 
particularly whether courts are confined to reviewing purely legal 
questions addressed by administrative bodies in the course of making 
decisions. The second is how to decide when reviewing courts should 
accord deference to administrative decision-makers and when they 
should not do so. And the third is how to conceive of judicial deference 
to administrative decision-making, or in practical terms, how a 
reviewing court is to decide that an administrative decision is 
sufficiently unreasonable that it must be overturned notwithstanding the 
court’s general posture of deference to the administrative decision-
maker. 
With respect to the first issue, the general scope of judicial review, I 
agree with earlier commentators who observed that, if Wilson J.’s 
reasons in National Corn Growers are read as limiting all substantive 
judicial review to an assessment of an administrative decision-maker’s 
interpretation of its enabling legislation, that conception of judicial 
review represents too narrow a view of the court’s mandate.130 It may be 
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possible to reconcile Wilson J.’s observations with mainstream 
jurisprudence by noting that courts are not bound by the parties’ 
characterization of the nature of the issues in dispute, and there will be 
circumstances in which the true nature of the dispute can be 
characterized as one that turns on a tribunal’s interpretation of its 
enabling statute. Nevertheless, it is clear from the jurisprudence that 
sufficiently serious errors in making factual findings131 or sufficiently 
unreasonable exercises of discretion132 can form the basis for judicial 
intervention as well as unreasonable interpretations of statute. 
With respect to the second issue, when deference is owed, it is clear 
from the foregoing discussion that Wilson J.’s views have been influential 
but have not entirely carried the day. Even if her general approach to 
deference has not been followed consistently by Canadian courts, Wilson 
J.’s methodological insights have been persuasive in identifying the perils 
of what has come to be known as “segmentation” of tribunal decision-
making.133 As far back as the use of the “preliminary and collateral 
questions” doctrine134 and the “wrong questions” doctrine,135 courts were 
expanding opportunities for intervention into administrative decision-
making by separating a tribunal’s decision into a number of discrete 
questions and finding that if the tribunal failed to answer one or more of 
those questions correctly in the view of the court, the tribunal had 
exceeded its jurisdiction. Excessive use of these doctrines was criticized 
by Dickson J. (as he then was) in C.U.P.E.,136 and one seldom sees 
reference to them in contemporary judicial review decisions. Nevertheless, 
their modern equivalent is found in such things as the tendency illustrated 
in the Barrie Public Utilities case137 to segment a specialist tribunal’s 
expertise into technical questions, on which the tribunal is entitled to 
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judicial deference, and general questions of law and interpretation, which 
the tribunal must decide correctly in the eyes of a reviewing court. 
Unfortunately, it has been easier to identify the risks of excessive 
segmentation than it has been to propose the abandonment of 
segmentation entirely. Indeed, even though Wilson J. seemed attracted 
by Professor Langille’s idea of a general posture of judicial deference to 
specialized tribunals, she did not fully embrace the idea that there were 
never circumstances in which correctness review was appropriate, and 
left that question for another day.138 The majority decision in Dunsmuir 
identified a number of situations in which it is presumptively appropriate 
for reviewing courts to use the correctness standard in reviewing an 
administrative decision, including determinations of constitutional 
questions by administrative bodies139 and determinations relating to the 
jurisdictional boundaries between two or more specialized tribunals.140 
These types of issues will rarely be the sole question facing an 
administrative body; they will more typically arise as part of a 
determination being made by the body in the course of exercising its 
statutory authority. If these types of issues are to be fully addressed by 
reviewing courts, therefore, it seems to me that more often than not the 
court will be engaged in segmentation of the administrative body’s 
decision. To say that segmentation in these circumstances is always 
inappropriate seems to me to represent an abandonment of a central 
function of judicial review, so in my view a sophisticated and 
comprehensive system of judicial review has to be prepared to 
countenance segmentation of decision-making in at least some 
circumstances. The key is to draw principled boundaries around when 
segmentation is appropriate, and to avoid the temptation to use 
segmentation as a vehicle to enable courts to engage in more searching 
review than is warranted by the circumstances. 
I want to concentrate my concluding observations on the third issue, 
our concept of deference, because this is the area in which I believe that 
neither Wilson J. in National Corn Growers nor the subsequent 
jurisprudence has offered sufficient guidance. It seems to me that where 
Wilson J.’s reasons made their most lasting contribution to contemporary 
judicial review jurisprudence was in identifying with clarity the different 
rationales for judicial deference to administrative decision-making. 
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Unfortunately, the tension inherent in these different rationales for 
deference was not resolved by her or in the jurisprudence to date. 
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere,141 a deferential standard of review 
is of limited practical utility until reviewing courts develop a sophisticated 
understanding not only of the rationales for deference but of the rationales 
for intervention notwithstanding a general posture of deference. 
It seems to me that the “statutory indeterminacy” rationale for 
deference sounds a useful precautionary note for courts in entering into 
the process of deferential review of administrative interpretations of 
statutes, but it is not an adequate explanation for why the court should 
accept an expert tribunal’s interpretation of a statute in preference to its 
own once it has taken careful account of the tribunal’s reasoning. The 
“presumed expertise” rationale provides a reason for the court to be 
willing to accept the tribunal’s interpretation as a general proposition, 
but it seems to me that it is not a particularly compelling reason. This 
rationale invites a reviewing court to presume that a specialized tribunal 
is more likely than the court to be able to identify the interpretation of 
the legislation that best combines the tribunal’s ability to operate 
effectively with respect for the limitations of its statutory mandate. By 
implication, however, it also invites the party dissatisfied with the 
tribunal’s decision to attempt to rebut that presumption. It is not 
impossible in my view to create a discipline for this process that makes it 
fundamentally different than review using a “correctness” standard. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that in the absence of such a discipline, 
Wilson J. was justified in her concern that if courts can be persuaded to 
inquire too closely into a tribunal’s reasoning in reaching its decision, 
the temptation to engage in “correctness” review under the guise of 
“reasonableness” review might be too great to resist. 
To the extent that the “economic management” rationale for deference 
is understood as simply reinforcing the “presumed expertise” rationale for 
tribunals that operate in certain subject matter areas, it shares the frailties 
of that rationale. It can be argued, however, that the “economic 
management” rationale depends less on the superiority of the tribunal’s 
specialized expertise than on the legislation’s decision to place managerial 
responsibility over a particular area of the economy into the hands of a 
tribunal. Although it is far from clear that Wilson J. saw the “economic 
management” rationale this way, it could be argued that this rationale is 
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better understood as a special instance of the “legislative choice” rationale 
rather than of the “presumed expertise” rationale. The “legislative choice” 
rationale does offer courts a compelling reason for preferring a tribunal’s 
interpretive choices to its own, because it instructs courts to respect the 
legislature’s decision to confer on the tribunal the basic right to make 
authoritative decisions, and more specifically to give authoritative 
meaning to a statute. As I will explain, I do not believe that this authority 
is unlimited, and the “legislative choice” rationale continues to offer courts 
a meaningful, albeit severely restricted, role in review using a 
reasonableness standard. It seems to me, however, that the “legislative 
choice” rationale for deference places courts in a qualitatively different 
position on judicial review than the “presumed expertise” rationale. 
To explain this difference, it is helpful to explore some of the 
rationales that can be offered for judicial intervention in tribunal 
decision-making notwithstanding a general posture of deference. A non-
exhaustive list that can be derived from Canadian case law includes the 
following reasons for intervention:142 
(1) A tribunal has made a decision in bad faith.143 
(2) A tribunal’s decision is grounded on a legal premise that is 
unquestionably incorrect (for example, the decision relies on a 
statutory provision that has been repealed).144  
(3) There are serious flaws in the logical underpinnings of a tribunal’s 
decision.145 
(4) A tribunal goes beyond its interpretive mandate and effectively seeks 
to amend its enabling legislation in the guise of interpreting it.146 
                                                                                                             
142
 For a more detailed explanation of this list, see id., at 94-99. 
143
 See, for example, Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.J. No. 1, [1959] S.C.R. 121 
(S.C.C.). 
144
 See Vernon (City) v. Vernon Professional Fire Fighters Assn., International Assn. of 
Fire Fighters, Local 1517, [1996] B.C.J. No. 1750 (B.C.S.C.), in which an arbitrator interpreting a 
piece of legislation that had recently been enacted relied on the text of the Bill that introduced the 
legislation, and the text of the relevant section had been amended on Third Reading. 
145
 See, for example, Toronto v. O.S.S.T.F., [1997] S.C.J. No. 27, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 487 
(S.C.C.); Mount Sinai Hospital, [2001] S.C.J. No. 43, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 342 (S.C.C.), per Binnie J. 
146
 See, for example, Lester, [1990] S.C.J. No. 127, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 644 (S.C.C.), per 
McLachlin J. 
(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LEGACY 259 
(5) A tribunal’s interpretation of its enabling legislation is inconsistent 
with basic and well accepted principles of statutory interpretation.147 
(6) A tribunal’s decision is inconsistent with basic legal norms in 
Canadian society.148 
(7) A tribunal’s decision is inconsistent with the policy objectives of its 
enabling legislation.149 
It seems to me that whatever rationale one adopts for deference to 
tribunal decision-making as a general proposition, the first two reasons 
on this list justify judicial intervention. In other words, even if we 
assume that the legislature intended to confer on a tribunal the power to 
make authoritative decisions including authoritative interpretations of its 
enabling legislation, it is both implausible and constitutionally offensive 
to suggest that the legislature intended to confer on a tribunal the 
authority to act in bad faith or to make decisions that are contrary to 
basic and uncontested rules of law. The third and fourth rationales for 
intervention are likely to provoke controversy in their application, since 
decision-makers are unlikely to agree that their decisions are 
fundamentally logically flawed or that they have stepped beyond the 
boundaries of interpretation and usurped the right to amend legislation. 
In principle, however, it seems to me that these rationales for 
intervention still respect the basic principle of legislative choice of an 
administrative body rather than as the final arbiter of the interpretation of 
a statute. This is because it is reasonable to assume that the legislature 
did not intend delegates of statutory authority to make decisions on a 
basis that is logically unsupportable or to amend rather than interpret 
their legislative mandates. 
As we move to the next three reasons for intervention, however, it 
seems to me that they are easier to reconcile with the “presumed 
expertise” rationale for deference than with the “legislative choice” 
rationale. For example, it seems to me that it is not inherently 
implausible to suggest that one reason a legislature might prefer to have 
a tribunal rather than a court make authoritative decisions about the 
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proper interpretation of a statute is that the legislature believes that the 
approach judges are likely to take, embedded as it is in certain 
approaches to the interpretation of legislative texts, will thwart rather 
than serve the legislature’s public policy goals. Similarly, it is plausible 
to suggest that legislatures may choose to use tribunals rather than 
judges as decision-makers because they want to avoid reliance on 
judicially defined legal norms. For example, it can be argued that 
legislatures moved collective bargaining disputes out of the courts and 
into the administrative tribunal arena precisely in order to avoid 
decision-makers who were likely to be influenced by the norms 
characteristic of the common law governing employment. A similar 
argument can be advanced for the use of workers’ compensation boards 
rather than courts to deal with industrial accidents and illness in order to 
avoid decision-making that was excessively influenced by the norms 
embedded in the common law of torts. Finally, it seems to me that for a 
court to invalidate a specialized tribunal’s decision on the basis that it is 
inconsistent with the policy goals of its enabling legislation comes 
perilously close to rejecting the legislative choice rationale entirely. If 
the legislative choice rationale is to be meaningful at all it must, in my 
view, include the right of the tribunal rather than the courts to define the 
policy objectives of its enabling statute and determine how best to 
balance the statute’s competing policy goals. 
To say that legislatures are entitled, within constitutional limits, to 
choose tribunals rather than courts as the final arbiters of statutory 
schemes for the reasons just enumerated is not the same thing as saying 
that the selection of decision-making by a specialized tribunal always 
carries with it the presumption that the legislature has made such a 
choice. Thus, it is not in my view inconsistent to maintain that courts can 
simultaneously respect the specialized expertise of tribunals and expect 
that the legislature both intended the tribunals to respect certain norms of 
statutory interpretation and intended judges to police compliance with 
those norms. Likewise, taking advantage of the virtues of specialized 
expertise need not imply the abandonment of a commitment to 
interpretation that is consistent with broader, judicially defined legal 
norms. Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that one of the roles of judicial 
review is to ensure that these norms are not too readily sacrificed by 
specialized tribunals in the pursuit of other public policy goals. Finally, 
it seems to me that recognizing that specialized tribunals will generally 
be in a better position than courts to determine whether or not a 
particular interpretation or decision best furthers the public policy goals 
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of a piece of legislation is not the same thing as saying that they will 
always do a better job than courts in making that determination. It is not 
in my view incoherent to suggest that some level of judicial scrutiny of a 
tribunal’s choices for consistency with a statute’s overall policy goals 
can represent a useful form of quality control over tribunal decision-
making, even if one must recognize its perils as well as its possibilities. 
I do not mean to suggest that explicit recognition of the differences 
between the rationales for judicial deference and intervention in 
administrative decision-making resolves all the tensions that exist at an 
operational level. For example, in her judgment in the National Corn 
Growers case, Wilson J. argued that the courts should not interfere with the 
tribunal’s adoption of a particular interpretation of its enabling legislation, 
and if the legislature was dissatisfied with that interpretation it was open to 
it to amend the legislation.150 These observations doubtless represented cold 
comfort to the disappointed litigants in those particular disputes, but they 
were a particularly robust expression of the logical implications of the 
“legislative choice” rationale for deference. It seems to me that the same 
reasoning was open to the Supreme Court in relation to the British 
Columbia Industrial Relations Council’s decision in Paccar,151 and indeed 
was arguably embraced by La Forest J. writing for the majority. Yet in that 
particular instance Wilson J. would have been willing to intervene and 
overturn the decision, which suggests that her commitment to the 
“legislative choice” rationale was not sufficiently robust to overcome her 
reluctance to accept every public policy choice that was logically open to a 
specialized tribunal. No doubt any theory of judicial deference is 
vulnerable to the understandable desire of a reviewing court to do justice to 
the litigants by imposing its understanding of the best approach to the 
substantive questions underlying the dispute. Nevertheless, it seems to me 
that explicit judicial recognition of the distinctions identified above would 
enrich our understanding of standard of review jurisprudence, and could 
assist in making that jurisprudence more internally consistent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Justice Wilson’s decision in the National Corn Growers152 case was 
a significant contribution to the development of Canadian jurisprudence 
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with respect to the common law judicial review of administrative 
decision-making. To argue as I do that Justice Wilson’s reasons do not 
represent a fully satisfactory account of judicial review is not in any way 
to underestimate the value of that contribution. Canadian thinking about 
judicial review has come a long way since the National Corn Growers 
case was decided in 1990, and it would be overly optimistic to believe 
that Dunsmuir153 represents the final resting place in the evolution of our 
jurisprudence. The fact that Justice Wilson’s reasoning in the National 
Corn Growers case still inspires debate is a testament to the power of her 
expression of her insights, and in this, as in many other areas of our law, 
Canadians owe her a profound debt of gratitude. 
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